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ABSTRACT
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the philosophy of subjectivity reached its limits. 
Various attempts at new thinking appeared as a reaction to these limits. Such attempts involve, 
among others, the philosophy of dialogue, which was represented in the works of Franz Rosen-
zweig, Martin Buber and Eberhard Grisebach. Another approach includes Martin Heidegger’s 
demand for returning to the question of Being. In this article, I intend to present that both 
attempts are similar in many ways, although their representatives tended to be critical of one 
another. However, the approaches of Martin Buber as well as Martin Heidegger prove to 
understand a man as a dynamic being who faces the calling. Firstly, I would like to analyse the 
thought of Martin Heidegger as presented in Being and time, then I will describe the thought 
of Martin Buber mainly based on his treaty I and Thou. Finally, I compare the similarities and 
differences in the thinking of both philosophers.
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According to Józef Tischner “There is always some more or less clear experien-
ce residing at the beginnings of the philosophy around which the thought of 
philosophers is revolving.”1 Considering this assumption, we can say that at the 
beginnings of Post-Cartesian philosophy, there is an experience of separated 
1 TISCHNER 1991: 5: “u początków filozofii tkwi zawsze jakieś mniej lub bardziej ja-
sno określone doświadczenie, wokół którego krąży myśl filozofa” (trans. A.J.). If there is no 
English translation available I will provide the original text in the footnotes.
* Uniwersytet Jagielloński. E-mail: artur.jewula@uj.edu.pl
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man, Pascal’s thinking reed, that wants to deprive the universe of its secrets. Man 
is a being most capable of getting to know the world and himself. Therefore, 
by thinking and experimenting, man asks questions and seeks answers in the 
world.
Philosophers in the twentieth century started at the new position and devel-
oped the philosophy of meeting and talking which today we call the philosophy 
of dialogue. This approach describes man as a being that is called. The calling 
is an event which man cannot ignore and to which he cannot be indifferent. 
The Other, not me, is in need and asks. This way he questions my domination, 
my power. I can regain myself by renouncing the Other and hiding in my inner 
world or by undertaking the calling and devoting myself to the Other.2 Or, in 
other words, by good or evil. Emmanuel Lévinas points out that in relation with 
the Other, it is his existence that is beyond question and it is my freedom that is 
unjustified.3 Ego cannot give a reason for his freedom by himself; he can gain it 
by devoting himself to the Other.
In this essay, I intend to analyse the question of being called, which is the 
most important element of understanding human existence for the approach 
described above. The variety of approaches found among various philosophers 
is too broad to be covered by this article. Therefore, I will limit myself to two 
philosophers who appeared at the beginning of the formation of this way of 
thinking, i.e., the thought of Martin Heidegger as introduced in his Being and 
time and the work of Martin Buber. Although Martin Heidegger’s work is not 
strictly dialogical, I want to show that his philosophy has a strong connection 
with the philosophy of dialogue when it comes to the question of being called.
The works of both thinkers contain several elements that can be defined as 
the core of the understanding the calling. As Michael Theunissen points out, 
2 Compare TISCHNER 2006: 77: “We are talking. It means: You are questioning me 
and I confirm you in your act of questioning me. It also means that by your act of questioning 
me you have questioned yourself in order to affirm me in what I will respond; You’re leaning 
toward me, waiting for my response. By responding I confirm myself. In the end it is I who 
responds. By accepting the response you confirm me — the one who you have previously 
questioned — and at the same time you confirm yourself who you have also questioned when 
you turned to me asking.” Questioning is a specific act of dethronement and the response is 
a possibility to confirm both me and the Other.
In original: “Rozmawiamy. To znaczy: ty kwestionujesz mnie, a ja mimo to potwierdzam 
ciebie w twoim akcie kwestionowania mnie. Znaczy to również, iż ty aktem swego pytania 
zakwestionowałeś siebie, aby uznać mnie w tym, co ci powiem; właśnie pochylony ku mnie 
czekasz na moją odpowiedź. Odpowiadając na pytanie, potwierdzam siebie. W końcu to ja 
odpowiadam. Przyjmując moją odpowiedź, potwierdzasz mnie — mnie, którego przedtem 
pytaniem swoim zakwestionowałeś — zarazem potwierdzasz siebie, którego też kwestionowa-
łeś, gdy zwracałeś się ku mnie.”
3 See LÉVINAS 1991: 84–88. Lévinas states there: “Existence is not in reality con-
demned to freedom, but is i n v e s t e d  as freedom […]. The presence of the Other, a privileged 
heteronomy, does not clash with freedom but invests it.”
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Heidegger’s thought is closely related both to Buber’s thought as well as to 
dialogical thinking in general (THEUNISSEN 1986: 375, footnote 9). Even 
Buber finds in Heidegger’s writings excerpts that express a dialogical under-
standing of man (BUBER 1988: 102). However, both these statements focus 
on Heidegger’s later works. Here I wish to compare the initial works of these 
two philosophers.
For both Heidegger and Buber, being called is characteristic typical only for 
man. Therefore, their analyses do not constitute a particular case of being called 
which could characterize every non-human entity. This is man, among other be-
ings, who is the only subject the calling is aimed at. Thus, being called is the most 
significant characteristic of man. I intend to show that these two philosophers 
describe a very similar structure, although they did not find many similarities 
in their thinking.
The new approach used to recognize the calling as the basic element of hu-
man existence entirely changes the perspective of the anthropology. The previous 
epistemological structure in which the subject was the dominant and active ele-
ment has been replaced with the model in which ego is not only less important 
a figure but also a passive one. This completely opens new space for the thought. 
Instead of observation and contemplating, thinking moves to listening and 
responding. In both cases this structure has an identical scheme, which centres 
around calling and, therefore, shifts from a perceivable object to a calling entity. 
In this way, the ego changes its position and becomes the submissive element in 
the whole structure. It is capable of acting only after hearing the call, which is 
always a type of responding. To see that it is not only a mere formal resemblance, 
we must analyse how the two philosophers perceive the calling. 
In Heidegger’s Being and time, man is ontologically described as a being in 
a privileged position to ask the question what the verb ‘to be’ means. Heidegger 
uses the term Dasein to refer to this ontological constitution of human beings. 
One of his ontological characteristics, existentialia, is ‘throwness’ into his exist-
ence. This includes the fact that Dasein falls into the everydayness and, at its 
root, is not oneself but it subordinates itself to the ‘they’, the public opinion, 
which covers his own possibility of Being. One of the basic features of the ‘they’ 
is that no one knows ‘who’ chooses its ways of being. The falling into everyday-
ness Dasein is being called. As Heidegger puts it, “The call reaches Dasein in 
this understanding of itself which it always has, and which is concernful in an 
everyday, average manner. The call reaches the they-self of concernful Being 
with Others” (HEIDEGGER 1962: 317 [H.272] — later quote in BT).4 In 
other words, it aims not at the Dasein in general but at the one that falls into 
the everydayness, the one that has had his own kind of Being covered, the one 
4 The number in brackets refers to German edition of Being and time.
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that is curious, eager for novelties, pausing only for a moment at the beings and 
saying-it-in-the-talk, calm and at ease with the world.
If we want to compare Buber, it is obvious that the called one is each indi-
vidual man in the actuality of his life. While commenting on several Hasidic 
tales, Buber writes “Every person born into this world represents something new, 
something that never existed before, something original and unique” (BUBER 
1950: 17). Thus, each man is someone unusual who cannot be reduced to any-
thing else, in particular to an object. In his individuality he can only be treated 
properly as a whole, which he constitutes. Only such an individual and complete 
man can be called. 
We will be able to perceive similarities if we notice the fact that Buber’s in-
dividual man is the entity characterized by a certain dualism of attitudes which 
man can have towards another being. On one hand, he can treat the entity as 
an object which possesses the qualities that can be categorized. On the other 
hand, it can refer to the entity in the direct relation which joins both of them 
acknowledging their distinctiveness. Buber described the first attitude using the 
term ‘I-It’, which refers to the epistemological approach to the world. The second 
attitude, ‘I-Thou’, is perceived by Buber as the source of human existence. The 
calling comes from Thou and is an invitation to enter the relation. Therefore, 
it cannot aim at the I from the primary word ‘I-Thou’ but at the I from the 
primary word ‘I-It’. Like Heidegger, Buber sees the called as a being who is lost 
in some way.
In both approaches there is someone or something apart from the called 
one that sends out the call. Heidegger finds the caller in the same Dasein that 
is called; however, this does not mean some inner voice of consciousness. In 
this case, the caller has a different manner of Being. For Heidegger, the caller is 
defined by its ownmost way of Being, and because of that it seems for everyday 
Dasein to be the strangest. “What could be more alien to the «they», lost in 
the manifold ‘world’ of its concern, than the Self which has been individualized 
down to itself in uncanniness and been thrown into the «nothing»?” (BT: 322 
[H.277]).
Being primarily an entity characterized by facticity, that is, throwness into 
the world and by existence, that is, understanding projecting of the Self, Dasein 
escapes from its ownmost kind of Being Self into the ‘they’. Yet, by escaping it 
conforms (acknowledges) its authenticity.
Rising from the fall, Dasein modifies its throwness into the world, which it 
cannot get rid of because it is determined ontologically by throwness. A double 
dependency emerges here in which, on one hand, ‘they’ is a modification of Be-
ing Self, resulting from the escape of Dasein from its ownmost kind of Being. 
On the other hand, the call of conscience is the modification of self-stamped-by-
they, consisting in the return to Being Self. This return, however, does not nullify 
the ‘they’ in which Dasein is absorbed. This is a way of interpreting Heidegger’s 
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words when he states “The call comes f r o m  me and yet o v e r  m e” (BT: 320 
[H.275]).5
The caller is perceived in a different way by Buber. In his view, there are three 
spheres where the relation can arise. These are: life with nature, life with men, 
and life with intelligible forms. Each of these spheres sends out a calling to say 
the primary word ‘I-Thou’. Therefore, we can speak about three kinds of ‘who’ 
calling depending on the sphere it comes from. The most important ‘who’ is 
facing the Other, acknowledging it as a whole being, as something individual 
and unique.
This description should be supplied with one significant remark. Buber, in 
the initial parts of I and Thou writes that “in every sphere in its own way, through 
each process of becoming that is present to us we look toward the fringe of the 
eternal T h o u; […] in each T h o u  we address the eternal T h o u” (BUBER 
1958: 6). The third part of his dissertation is entirely devoted to the eternal 
Thou, which he understands as God. God is such Thou who, by his nature, can 
never become It.
Another element of the structure is the calling itself. While the analysis of 
the caller and the called one shows differences, the calling is very similar in both 
cases. For Heidegger, Dasein is called to its ownmost kind of Being. Let’s have 
a closer look at this issue, what the Self to which Dasein is called means. Here is 
what Heidegger says in Being and time. 
When the self-stamped-by-they is appealed to, it gets called to the Self. But it does not get 
called to that Self which can become for itself an ‘object’ on which to pass judgement, nor 
to that Self which inertly dissects its ‘inner life’ with fussy curiosity, nor to that Self which 
one has in mind when one gaze ‘analytically’ at physical conditions and what lies behind 
them. The appeal to the Self in the self-stamped-by-they does not force it inwards upon 
itself, so that it can close itself off from the ‘external world’. The call passes over everything 
like this and disperses it, so as to appeal solely to that Self which, notwithstanding, is in no 
other way than Being-in-the-world (BT: 318 [H.273]).
The calling is indefinite; ontologically it gives nothing that could be under-
stood as a present-at-hand object to realize. As such, it says nothing, it is silent. 
But the silence is a mode of discourse, only he who has something to say can 
keep silent. It means that “To be able to keep silence, Dasein […] must have at 
its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself ” (BT: 208 [H.165]). 
Silence contrasts with the superficiality of idle talk by concentrating on the de-
pendability of the discourse. This way “reticence Articulates the intelligibility of 
Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a potentiality-for-hearing 
5 “Der Ruf kommt aus mir und doch über mich” is translated by Macquarrie & Robinson 
as: “The call comes f r o m  me and yet f r o m  b e y o n d  m e”, which does not fully represent 
the meaning of the German preposition über. In this instance Heidegger states that the calling 
comes from me and at the same time it has authority over me, it subdues and obliges me.
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which is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent” (BT: 
208 [H.165]). By being silent, the call calls Dasein to keep silent as well. By do-
ing this, Dasein enables in itself the ability to hear the call properly and to rise 
from the falling into the ‘they’. Dasein can understand itself only by keeping 
silent. Therefore, the calls gives no content, “«nothing» gets called to this Self, 
but it has been s u m m o n e d  to itself ” (BT: 318 [H.273]), it does not call to do 
something but it summons from the fall.
Buber is also of the opinion that the call cannot have specific content that 
can be described in general terms. The reason for this is that every situation and 
every calling being is unique; therefore, it cannot be communicated in the lan-
guage of the world of It, which tries to categorize and organize everything. The 
lack of specific content is not a negative characteristic of the call because
[…] just as the most eager speaking at one another does not make a conversation […], so 
for a conversation no sound is necessary, not even a gesture. Speech can renounce all the 
media of sense, and it is still speech (BUBER 2002: 3).
The call is always defined by the current situation that brings the whole and 
unique Thou with it as well. This, however, is not expressible in general terms. 
The only generalization we can draw from this analysis is the fact that everyone 
who has been called is bound to make a decision whether to accept the call or 
to reject it. Thus, the call calls to response, as each of the above choices is a type 
of response.
The last element of the structure of the calling is the manner and means of the 
response. In the case of Heidegger’s thought, by hearing the call, Dasein brings 
itself to and before itself. By doing this, it makes a choice, it chooses itself. “Un-
derstanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, which, as 
such, cannot be chosen. What is chosen is having-a-conscience as Being-free for 
one’s ownmost Being-guilty” (BT: 334 [H.288]). Wanting to have a conscience 
discloses Dasein in a preferred manner. For this way of disclosure Heidegger 
uses the term resoluteness. In resoluteness Dasein understands itself, the world, 
and others according to their ways of Being. Resoluteness neither pushes Dasein 
out of the world and others nor sends it to some paradise afterlife, but it allows 
Dasein to have a proper relation to other beings. Dasein is first and foremost 
Being-in-the-world and Being-with. This ontological character of his cannot 
be erased by the resoluteness but it can be revealed by it. “Resoluteness brings 
the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, 
and pushes it into solicitous Being with others” (BT: 343 [H.297]). Resoluteness 
as an understanding and projecting decision allows Dasein to understand and 
project properly the Self, the world and others.
Resoluteness reveals ‘there’ (da) of the Dasein or “the current factical involve-
ment-character of the circumstances” (BT: 346 [H.300]), which Heidegger 
329The call and the response: Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber...
calls a situation. Resoluteness does not separate Dasein and ‘they’, just the op-
posite. The decision always relies on everyday world because it is part of Dasein’s 
ontological constitution. Resoluteness must continuously confirm the will of 
having-a-conscience, for the possibility of falling is never closed. Dasein must 
choose its ownmost kind of Being all the time or it will be pulled again into the 
everydayness. Wanting to have a conscience is a project that needs to be continu-
ally confirmed and sustained.
For Buber, responding is the acting, which involves the whole person. For 
that matter, the relation is exclusive and direct. If man does not have enough 
courage and does not step with his whole being into the relation, he will betray 
it. If there is a space for anything else than the connection of I and Thou, the 
relation cannot come into existence but only a phantom which can be even more 
deceptive than the world of It.
In the thought of Buber, taking up the calling of the Other — because it is 
a response — becomes a responsibility for the Other. In order to gain Self, one 
must surrender oneself and its freedom. But what man is really giving up here 
is the I from the primary word I-It, and he prepares the space for the I from the 
primary word I-Thou. This is how man’s freedom manifests itself, by the ability 
to say I-Thou.
The relation has two poles. On one hand, there is something that happens 
to us and that we cannot influence or force, and on the other hand, there is our 
decision to step into it. As Buber puts it, “the relation means being chosen and 
choosing, suffering and action in one” (BUBER 1958: 11). In relation, Thou 
affects me and I affect Thou and everything we do influences the Other in some 
way. This conclusion allows Buber to make a transition from ‘responding to’ to 
‘responsibility for’.6
The responsibility which emerges from responding to the call is love. But 
love is not a feeling, as feelings are part of the world of It. They are features of 
the subject upon which it can build its identity. As an internal part of the entity 
they do not require its correlative to be present. For Buber, “feelings are «en-
tertained»: love comes to pass” (BUBER 1958: 14).7 Thou is not a content of 
the experience and I is not a subject of feeling. Love happens between, in a place 
where two persons connect in the mutual relation. It does not categorize but it 
lets both persons be in their presence and recognize their whole existence.
I is formed according to the decision man takes after meeting Thou. The 
twofold I of man can become either a closed and separated will or a respon-
sible person. In correspondence to this, a human life takes either a shape of 
6 Just as in English, the German language also shows this transition at the language level: 
antworten an (respond to) becomes verantworten für (be responsible for).
7 In original: “Gefühle werden «gehabt», die Liebe geschieht”. Buber uses passive voice 
and the past participle of the verb to have. Thus entertained should be understood here as be-
ing possessed in contrast to active geschehen (to happen, to occur).
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monologue or dialogue but “the realms of the life of dialogue and the life of 
monologue do not coincide with the realms of dialogue and monologue even 
when forms without sound and even without gesture are included” (BUBER 
2002: 22). Not every conversation is an example of a dialogical life but the one 
in which interlocutors refer directly to each other, when they do not hide their 
agendas or pretend in order to please their interlocutors. Also rich social life is 
not an instance of a dialogical life because “the life of dialogue is not the one in 
which you have much to do with men, but one in which you really have to do 
with those with whom you have to do” (BUBER 2002: 23).
The above description of both approaches allows us now to try to find simi-
larities and differences in the understanding of being called. Both philosophers 
recognize in a man’s contemporary condition missing his real essence, his life 
does not correspond to what he really is. A human being has found himself in 
a world in which he loses his humanity. However, that general statement has 
several important aspects. 
One of the vital issues in both cases is the question of the Other. The Other 
is an important factor both for the Dasein’s ownmost kind of Being as well as for 
the primary word I-Thou. In Buber’s thought, the reality of meeting the Other is 
explicitly expressed and it is the basis of the entire analysis. In Heidegger’s work, 
the relation with the Other man is possible in the existentialia of Being-with 
(mitdasein). Heidegger stresses that Being Self does not mean closing in one’s 
subjectivity. “Only because Dasein as such is determined by selfhood can an I-self 
comport itself toward a you-self. Selfhood is the presupposition for the possibility 
of being «I», the latter only ever being disclosed in the «you»” (HEIDEGGER 
1998: 122). The existentialia of Being-with is equally primal as mineness, as only 
through reference with Dasein-with Dasein may be authentically. This stands in 
opposition to Haim Gordon’s thesis that in Heidegger “emphatic description of 
Dasein as equipment-oriented, Heidegger is impoverishing human relations” 
(GORDON 2001: 86) and that “in the Heidegger corpus, genuine meetings 
between Daseins, and the exciting possibilities emerging from such meetings, 
seem to have no primary or lasting relation to Dasein’s selfhood” (GORDON 
2001: 104). I would stipulate the opposite here. Since Dasein-with is from the 
beginning in relation to Dasein it could have a possibility to disclose to Dasein 
its ownmost kind of Being. Janusz Mizera suggests the following interpretation. 
He writes: “Other Dasein is disclosed to my Dasein and vice versa. My Dasein 
has no priority over Dasein of the Other […]. The primordial phenomenon is 
Being with and for the Other” (MIZERA 1991: 85).8 An analogous view can be 
also found at Lévinas: “Fürsorge, as a response to essential destitution, is a mode 
of access to the otherness of the Other” (LÉVINAS 1996: 33).
8 “Inne Dasein jest otwarte na moje Dasein i vice versa. Własne Dasein nie posiada żadnego 
prymatu wobec Dasein drugiego. […] Pierwotnym zjawiskiem jest bycie z drugim i dla dru-
giego.”
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Although many of Gordon’s theses are valid and he follows the texts fairly 
accurately, he seems to forget that he analyses the lectures Heidegger delivered 
during 1927–1928. This is already after writing and publishing Being and time 
so that Heidegger’s lectures should always be interpreted in the light of the Be-
ing and time. I agree with Gordon that Heidegger rejects I-Thou relation in his 
writings. But I did not see it as ‘impoverishing human relations’. This is because 
I find his rejection to be based on a different approach. Heidegger’s goal at this 
time is to restate the question of Being, and all his analyses are conducted to 
show the ontological difference. From this point of view, the I-Thou relation 
can be viewed at the ontical level, that is, regarding the entities and not Being. 
That is why Heidegger ignores the ‘ontology of love and friendship’ (GOR-
DON 2001: 108), as those are relations that are on the ontical level are merely 
specifications of ontological being-with Others.
Authentic Dasein is characterized by authentic solicitude, that is, understand-
ing the other in its authentic Being Self. This attitude causes Dasein, in its rela-
tion to the Other, to not take or cover their ownmost possibilities of Being, as it 
happens in the case of ‘they’, but it allows the Other to be authentically. 
It does not so much leap on for the Other as leap ahead of him in his existen-
tial potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give 
it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude […] 
helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free 
for it (BT: 158–159 [H.122]).
In other words, “when Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of 
Others” (BT: 344 [H.298]). This is the point where we can find a place for 
encountering living people.
The above statement was thoroughly analysed by Strzelecki. He argues that 
the authentic mode of solicitude aims at the Being of the Other, and its goal is 
to disclose to him its ownmost kind of Being. Dasein is not indifferent to this 
project, as it is also its own project of authentic Being — it binds its faith with 
the faith of the Other (STRZELECKI 2006: 95–96). Resoluteness causes Da-
sein to project to its ownmost kind of Being, which means resoluteness deter-
mines the responsibility for authentic Being of the Other. Strzelecki concludes 
that “resoluteness for Self automatically breaches the everyday covering the 
possibilities of Being authentically […] In this sense Dasein cannot not be the 
conscience of others” (STRZELECKI 2006: 97).9
Jacek Filek also stresses those fragments that try to give a positive description 
of Being with others. He points out that hearing belongs to the existentialia of 
discourse and understanding and states that 
9 “[…] zdecydowanie na Siebie automatycznie czyni wyłom w świecie publicznej zmowy 
milczenia o możności bycia na sposób własny […]. W tym sensie zdecydowane Dasein wręcz 
nie może nie być sumieniem innych.”
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If hearing is based on understanding then Dasein — as understanding Being-with others 
— can obey the Other when it hears its Dasein-with ‘correctly’. In this case obedience will 
have the character of the response to what was, thanks to understanding, heard (FILEK 
2003: 130).10 
Resoluteness not only modifies the existentialia of Being-in-the-world but 
also of Being-with and through that Dasein becomes solicitous of Being of 
 others.
Theunissen shows a similar interpretation where he states that 
[…] the tendency to admit being-with-one-another into the foundation of Dasein is most 
extreme where Heidegger — in a unique attempt, admittedly — binds the formal structu-
re of the self together with that of being toward the Other (THEUNISSEN 1986: 175). 
He refers to the part of Being and time where this binding is evident. Heidegger 
writes that in order to ontologically understand assigning-itself (Zusammenhang 
des Sichverweisens des Daseins) “the «for-the-sake-of-which» signifies an «in-
order-to»; this in turn, a «towards-this»; the latter, an «in-which» of letting 
something to be involved; and in turn, the «with-which» of an involvement” 
(BT: 120 [H.87]). So Theunissen concludes that 
[…] according to Heidegger, only those who cut the I off from the Other must latch onto 
‘empathy’ as that act that is supposed to instate the initially absent bond between the I and 
the Other (THEUNISSEN 1986: 175).
We can see now that Heidegger sees the uniqueness of the Other in the 
constitution of authentic Dasein. Mizera notices that “Being-with nullifies the 
I-other dualism and thus the element of mediation that would connect I and the 
other is redundant” (MIZERA 1991: 91).11 This applies especially to the process 
of transmission of our psychic world to the other, as through the existentialia 
of Being-with the Other is understood at the same moment as we understand 
our own Being. “Meeting is made on the primary ground of Being-with” (MI-
ZERA 1991: 85).12 This understanding of the Other is not just a different type 
of transmission, this time on the ontological level, but it is understanding his 
own and unique kinds of Being. This is also the response to Gordon’s critique 
that Heidegger incorrectly rejects the I-Thou relation. The contrast between 
10 “[…] jeżeli słyszenie opiera się na rozumieniu, to Dasein — jako rozumiejące współbycie 
z innymi — «dobrze» słysząc swoje współdasein ma możliwość stać się mu posłuszne. Posłu-
chanie będzie miało tu charakter odpowiedzi na to, co dzięki rozumieniu zostało usłyszane.” 
Filek indicates the vicinity of the terms ‘to hear’ and ‘to obey’, which is not evident in English 
but is clear in German hören and gehorsam as well as in Polish ‘słuchać’ and ‘być posłusznym’.
11 “[…] współbycie likwiduje dualizm Ja-inny, sprawiając tym samym, że zbyteczne staje się 
wprowadzanie czynnika pośredniczącego, łączącego Ja z innymi […].”
12 “Napotkanie — Mizera concludes — dokonuje się już na pierwotnym gruncie współ-
bycia.”
333The call and the response: Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber...
Heidegger and Buber is not because of the fact that “Dasein’s finding its self is 
a solitary endeavour of its consciousness” (GORDON 2001: 83),13 but rather 
as Michael Theunissen points out, the term I for Heidegger has mostly phenom-
enological connotations with the thought of Husserl and Kant (THEUNIS-
SEN 1986: 168–169).
What makes some interpreters, together with Buber, belittle the importance 
of the Other in Heidegger’s thought? One reason is the fact that Dasein-with 
is not met without any mediation like it is in the case of Buber. Dasein meets 
the Other while using tools. Then it finds something that has not been made or 
used by it. The Other is an element that breaks the teleological structure of the 
Dasein’s world. Only then it is possible to recognize the Other and relate to it 
in a special mode of the care, that is solicitude. In this mode of caring, “Dasein 
relates to the Other and in this way it meets it” (MIZERA 1991: 86).14 There-
fore, meeting the Other happens entirely in the Dasein and not between them.
Buber objects to this fact and writes: “In man’s existence with man it is not 
solicitude, but the essential relation, which is primal” (BUBER 2002: 201). The 
essential relation is the one in which “the barriers of individual being are in fact 
breached and a new phenomenon appears only in this way: one life open to an-
other” (BUBER 2002: 201). Thus, solicitude cannot reach the Other because 
“he who has the access without the caring [solicitude] will find it again also in 
caring; he who is devoid of that access will clothe the naked and feed the hungry 
in vain” (LÉVINAS 1996: 37). Buber, however, understands solicitude as caring 
for the needs of the others and does not see the ontological level of solicitude, 
which does not impose any particular things to do, but only opens the possibility 
of meeting the Other.
The relation between Dasein and Dasein-with does not leave the Dasein. 
Solicitude at its basis manifests itself through breaching the idle talk in order for 
the Dasein-with to be able to hear its conscience. There is no meeting of the two 
beings, as it happens in Buber’s opinion. One of Heidegger’s provides the follow-
ing summary: “Dasein-with cannot be met as actually the other, in his otherness 
and opposition but it constitutes the structure of Dasein just like Being-with” 
(BARAN 1988: 190–191).15
For Buber, a man does not know anything about the Other until he meets 
him by hearing the call. Dasein, on the other hand, understands the Being of 
the Other in a way which cannot be changed by the Other. It is Dasein’s duty to 
take its ownmost kind of Being and by doing so relate to the Other according 
to its way of Being. That shows the fundamental difference between the two 
13 Although I agree with Gordon that Heidegger’s analysis focuses on the activity of the 
subject rather than on encountering others.
14 “Dasein bierze wzgląd na innego i w ten sposób go napotyka.”
15 “Współdasein nie może być spotykany jako rzeczywiście inny, w całej swej odmienności 
i przeciw-stawności, lecz stanowi właśnie tak samo jak współbycie strukturę Dasein.”
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approaches. Even the proper mode of solicitude is always mediated by Dasein’s 
own Being. It is “Ownmost kind of Being that «pushes» Dasein to the proper 
way of solicitude in Being with Dasein-with” (FILEK 2003: 131),16 but it is not 
that Dasein-with brings Dasein its ownmost kind of Being.
Buber’s view on this issue is located on the opposite position. According to 
him, Heidegger loses the most important element of human relations, which is 
what he calls Between (Zwischen). Between is the plane on which two beings 
can fully meet, open to each other. This openness aims not at Being of the Other 
but at the entire person. 
The Between is not to be found ‘in the I,’ that is, neither in the (psychic) interiority of the 
subjective pole of intentionality nor in the noematic objectivity of a horizontally compre-
hended world, oriented upon the I, and dependent upon it (THEUNISSEN 1996: 276). 
But at the same time the Between does not belong to the Other as well. The 
sphere of the Between is the characteristic of the I-Thou world, where no me-
diation is possible. As Theunissen puts it, “the relation to the Thou is, however, 
immediate because in it the I is separated from its partner, but not through the 
barrier of the meaning-instituting project” (THEUNISSEN 1996: 275).
The relation that occurs in the sphere of the Between is mutual. Buber states 
that “Relation is mutual. […] We live our lives inscrutably included within the 
streaming mutual life of the universe” (BUBER 1958: 15–16). However, mu-
tuality is not a type of formal symmetry or the identity of reference as “there are 
some I-Thou relationships which, in their nature, may not unfold to full mutual-
ity if they are to persist in that nature” (BUBER 1958: 131). What happened 
to I and what happens to Thou is not identical but as Thou acts upon I, I by 
its response acts on Thou. If we now consider the eternal Thou, the mutuality 
would mean “the divine voice speaking in what befalls man, and man answering 
in what he does or forbears to do” (BUBER 1998: 17).
Mutuality was strongly opposed by Lévinas, as he saw contradiction between 
the mutuality and the ethical sense of the relation. According to him, 
The originality of the I-Thou comes from the fact that the relation is known not from the 
outside, but from the I who brings it about. Its place is therefore not interchangeable with 
the place occupied by the Thou (LÉVINAS 1996: 32).
Otherwise, as Marek Jędraszewski points out “Mutuality could be a subject 
of objectification and thematization which would push it — in accordance to 
Buber’s thought — to the world of It” ( JĘDRASZEWSKI 1987: 134).17
16 “ […] właściwe bycie sobą «popycha» Dasein ku pełnemu właściwej troskliwości byciu 
ze swym współdasein.”
17 “[…] wzajemność ta podlega obiektywizacji i tematyzacji, spadając — zgodnie z doktry-
ną Bubera — do rangi To.”
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The above argument about the destruction of ethics by the formalization of 
the relation is valid in the respect that it shows the threat of incorrectly perceived 
relation. If Buber understands the relation as the symmetry and formalism, as 
Lévinas perceives it, then his objection is legitimate. Buber, however, does not 
understand the relation in this manner. For him, as the reality of the meeting is 
not empty, it only cannot be described in the language of the world of It. Maurice 
Friedman writes that “this mutuality does not mean simple unity or identity, 
nor is it form of empathy” (FRIEDMAN 1955: 61). Mutuality for Buber does 
not mean the interchangeable positions but the mutual influence of one person 
on another.
In order to better understand what Buber has in mind under the term mutu-
ality, let us look at several places where he describes it more closely. Buber had 
the opportunity to answer Lévinas’s questions, and in a letter to him he writes 
that 
[…] the relation appears to me to reach its greatness and authentic energy when two hu-
man beings not very akin to one another spiritually, (who belong rather to different, even 
opposing, spiritual families) face one another in such a way that even in the course of the 
sharpest controversy, one of them knows, focuses on, identifies, recognizes, accepts and 
confirms the other as that particular person (LÉVINAS 1996: 36–37). 
This shows that the mutuality is based on the recognition and acceptance of 
the otherness of the Other. “Though the Thou is not an It, it is also not «an-
other I»” (FRIEDMAN 1955: 61). In the live dialogue of I and Thou, I affirms 
the otherness of Thou as well as Thou which faces I affirms his uniqueness. In 
the primary sense, the mutuality of the relation is the affirmation of the encoun-
tered being. 
There is one more element in the way of responding that Lévinas did not 
notice. According to Buber:
[…] it may be that I have to respond at once, to this very man before me; it may be that the 
saying has a long and manifold transmission before it, and that I am to answer some other 
person at some other time and place, in who knows what language (BUBER 2002: 12). 
This shows that the response could not be given at the moment of the meet-
ing but it is transmitted to the other time and people. Although the relation is 
exclusive, it does not have to end with the return to the world of It.
The mutuality is most widely described when it comes to the relation with 
the eternal Thou. “Man receives, and he receives not a specific «content» 
but a Presence, a Presence as power” (BUBER 1958: 110) and the presence 
contains the fullness of the relation, of being accepted and of being con-
nected as well as confirmation of meaning, the meaning of our life (BUBER 
1958: 110).  Mutuality appears here as a presence of being face to face, the actual 
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Gegenwart,18 the fact that I and Thou are accepted by each other and joined in 
the sphere of ‘between’ (BUBER 2002: 241).
Being-with and mutuality express the unique and important position of 
the Other for the becoming human being. As we can see, both concepts have 
many similarities, although neither Heidegger nor Buber see that. Just as the 
mutuality and Being-with define the relation to the Other, they also influence 
the analysis of man himself. The major difference lies in the directness of the 
relation. Where Heidegger introduces the care as the mediation between I and 
Thou, Buber stipulates unmediated openness to the Other and accepting him 
in his otherness.
Buber acknowledges that responding to becomes responsibility for. His fur-
ther analysis reveals that “factually, responsibility only exists when the court is 
there to which I am responsible” (BUBER 2002: 20). Remembering that for 
Buber each relation with Thou reaches in the end the eternal Thou, it is plain to 
assume that God becomes the instance that imposes responsibility. Being face to 
face with God increases the responsibility, as the response is given not to a single 
entity but to the whole world. Man who is in the face of the eternal Thou 
[…] is not freed from responsibility; he has exchanged the torment of the finite, pursuit 
of effects, for the motive power of the infinite, he has got the mighty responsibility of love 
for the whole untraceable world-event, for the profound belonging to the world before the 
Face of God (BUBER 1958: 108–109).
This would suggest that the call not only means that the response to the call 
of God becomes the responsibility for him, but that it also becomes responsibil-
ity before him. Filek points out in this context that “By claiming that there is 
no responsibility without the instance before which we are responsible and by 
binding this instance with God, [Buber] shows the coercion to the responsibil-
ity” (FILEK 2002: 92).19
When it comes to Heidegger, there is no explicit analysis of responsibility. 
However, we can show that his description of inauthenticity and authenticity 
of the self-stamped-by-they leads to the positive notion of responsibility. Such 
interpretation has been presented by Filek in his work Filozofia odpowiedzalności 
XX wieku in which he states: “Showing voice of conscience as a mode of dis-
course allows to see in it the structure of responsibility similar to the one we 
18 This term, which is translated into English as presence, has a very technical meaning. 
Gegenwart is the opposite of Gegenstand. The later literally means object and describes some-
thing that stands still in before us. Gegenwart has similar structure: it describes something that 
waits in front of us, waits for our response. While Gegenstand is dead and static, Gegenwart is 
a live being.
19 “[…] twierdząc, iż nie ma odpowiedzialności bez owej instancji, przed którą odpowia-
damy, i wiążąc tę instancję z osobą Boga, chcąc nie chcąc ukazuje przymuszenie do odpowie-
dzialności.”
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know from the works of the philosophers of dialogue” (FILEK 2003: 116).20 
Thus, we can pose a question of the instance imposing the responsibility. 
Dasein is being called from his inauthenticity to his authenticity. The one 
who calls, as well as the one who is called, is Dasein. Dasein is therefore the only 
entity that can impose responsibility. It is the authentic Dasein that has any right 
to make a judgement about rising of the inauthentic Dasein from falling. Irre-
sponsibility, according to Heidegger’s thought, is a kind of Being that does not 
respond to the call of conscience (FILEK 2003: 124). The responsibility takes 
the form of self-responsibility: Dasein imposes the responsibility on Dasein for 
its authentic Being.
It could be tempting to try to put the Dasein-with in the position of the in-
stance imposing the responsibility. However, such an attempt seems contradic-
tory to the analysis presented in Being and time. Although Dasein can relate to 
the Other in care that aims at its Being, this mode of care is not the call of the 
Other. Because Dasein-with cannot directly call Dasein to its ownmost kind of 
Being, it cannot be the instance imposing the responsibility as well. The connec-
tion between Being of Dasein and Dasein-with is possible but only as the help of 
hearing the voice of conscience and not as the form of the call itself.
The above interpretation clearly shows that in both approaches understand-
ing of the human condition is closely connected to the notion of responsibility. 
In both cases responsibility is not comprehended as punishment or reward after 
the committed deed but as a condition of his life that influences all his decisions 
before taking action. What is more, this way of understanding the responsibil-
ity focuses not on the consequences but on the action itself. Both philosophers 
admit that it is impossible to cancel the everyday attitude. What is important 
is the readiness to answer when we face the call. That is the place where the 
responsibility as the decision to respond to the call occurs. Since each way of 
reacting is a type of responsibility it moves from the feature to the ontological 
characteristic of man.
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